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Abstract Corporate deﬁned-beneﬁt plans suffer from a number of serious weak-
nesses, including credit risk of the sponsor, ambiguous ownership of the surplus and
back-loading of beneﬁts. Also deﬁned-contribution plans feature drawbacks. Individ-
uals are not well equipped to make the complex ﬁnancial decisions involved, trans-
action costs are substantial and various risks are not managed properly over the life
cycle. Stand-alone collective pension schemes offer an attractive third way between
corporate deﬁned-beneﬁt schemes and individual deﬁned-contribution schemes. The
members of the fund are the risk bearers and the funds manage risk aimed at provid-
ing an adequate income level during retirement at low costs. Dutch pension funds are
evolving into such stand-alone pension schemes. Some directions for future reforms
are sketched.
Keywords Stand-alone pension schemes · Netherlands · Risk
JEL Classiﬁcation J32 · J10 · J40 · J24
1 Introduction
All over the world retirement systems are under severe pressure. In continental Eu-
ropean countries, large pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes are vulnerable to aging, in
This paper was prepared for the 64th congress of the International Institute of Public Finance,
Maastricht, the Netherlands, August 22–25, 2008. The authors thank various participants and an
anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
L. Bovenberg () · T. Nijman
Scientiﬁc Directors Netspar, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: A.L.Bovenberg@uvt.nl
T. Nijman
e-mail: nyman@uvt.nl444 L. Bovenberg, T. Nijman
general, and low fertility rates, in particular. Occupational deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) plans
in which companies guarantee pension beneﬁts are being phased out in the Anglo-
Saxon world. The retreat of governments and corporations as sponsors of pension
systems calls for institutional innovation in pension insurance.
This paper argues that stand-alone collective pension schemes in which par-
ticipants share risk among themselves are an attractive third way between corpo-
rate deﬁned-beneﬁt schemes and individual deﬁned-contribution (DC) pension plans
that are increasingly replacing these corporate deﬁned-beneﬁt plans in Anglo-Saxon
countries. Whereas the traditional occupational deﬁned-beneﬁt schemes are not sus-
tainable because neither sponsors nor young and future participants are willing to
provide expensive guarantees to the retirees, individual pension plans suffer from ﬁ-
nancial illiteracy of members and associated marketing and other transaction costs.
We illustrate the potential beneﬁts of stand-alone cooperative pension funds by focus-
ing on the case of occupational pension plans in the Netherlands. Indeed, the Dutch
pension system contains strong elements that may be appealing to other countries.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the challenges
currently faced by the elaborate public PAYG systems in continental Europe, by the
occupational DB plans and by individual DC plans. Section 2.1 argues that conti-
nental European countries should focus their public PAYG retirement systems on
poverty alleviation by gradually reducing public beneﬁts for those earning higher in-
comes. These schemes should then be gradually supplemented by funded schemes to
allow these higher income earners to smooth consumption over the life cycle. Sec-
tion 2.2 turns to occupational DB plans offering guaranteed pensions and shows that
these plans are increasingly expensive, while their pension promises often end up be-
ing empty because of the dependence on the sponsor. We therefore argue that these
plans should be phased out, as is indeed happening in many countries. Discussing
the individual DC plans that are gradually replacing important parts of the pay-as-
you-go and corporate DB plans, Sect. 2.3 argues that these schemes generally are
poorly designed. The analysis of Sect. 2 thus leads to the conclusion that institutional
innovation in retirement management is called for.
Section 3 describes Dutch sectoral occupational pension schemes, which have
been evolving in the direction of stand-alone pension funds. These pension schemes
assist individuals in accessing ﬁnancial markets and exploiting the potential of com-
plex ﬁnancial instruments in managing risks. The strengths of these schemes are dis-
cussed in Sect. 4. Section 5 analyzes to what extent these schemes remedy the short-
comings of traditional DB and DC schemes and describes several further reforms
that would make these pension schemes more robust in view of various trends, such
as aging and increased mobility of workers on transitional labour markets. Section 6
concludes.
2 Retirement systems under stress
Retirement systems around the world can be classiﬁed in three broad groups: public
PAYG schemes, occupational DB schemes and individual DC schemes. This section
discusses the shortcomings of these schemes, thereby setting the stage for a discus-
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Table 1 Pension systems in various countries
% of total retirement beneﬁts
The Netherlands Germany France Italy Spain Switzerland UK US
PAYG public pensions 50 85 79 74 92 42 65 45
Occupational pensions 40 5 6 1 4 32 25 13
Personal pensions 10 10 15 25 4 26 10 42
Source: Börsch-Supan (2004)
2.1 Pay-as-you-go schemes
PAYG schemes pay the retirement beneﬁts of the older generations by levying con-
tributions on the younger, working generations. The retirement promise is thus not
backed by ﬁnancial assets but rather by the power of the government to force the
younger generations to transfer resources to the elderly. In the larger continental Eu-
ropean countries (including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), the pension system
relies almost exclusively on PAYG ﬁnancing. This makes these countries especially
vulnerable to lower fertility because PAYG schemes rely on human capital of the
young to ﬁnance the pensions of older generations. As generations invest less in the
human capital of the next generations by reducing fertility, they should invest more in
ﬁnancial capital. Lower fertility thus calls for gradually shifting from pay-as-you-go
ﬁnancing to funded pension schemes (see Sinn 2000).1
The large continental European countries that rely almost exclusively on PAYG
ﬁnancing for the provision of retirement income have integrated the two main func-
tions of pensions—poverty alleviation and old-age insurance—into a single compre-
hensive public pension system. These countries should consider focusing the public
scheme on poverty alleviation by gradually reducing earnings-related PAYG bene-
ﬁts for those earning higher incomes.2 This would yield a better-balanced portfolio
between funded and PAYG schemes, as workers with middle- and higher incomes
substitute private, funded pensions for public PAYG beneﬁts (see Table 1). Individu-
als would thus better diversify political, demographic and market risks. Among other
things, the pension system would become less vulnerable to low fertility rates.
The public scheme dealing with poverty alleviation is explicitly redistributive and
should be ﬁnanced from general tax revenues. Reliance on broad-based taxes paid by
the entire population, rather than on payroll taxes, shifts the tax burden away from
workers to those outside the labour force, including the retired. Including retirement
beneﬁts in the base of the progressive income tax would allow the tax system to
continue to play an effective role in intra- and intergenerational risk sharing. In this
1Another policy option for countries with low fertility rates and PAYG pension systems is to stimulate
fertility (see, e.g. van Groezen et al. 2003).
2A ﬂat public pension may be preferred over means-tested public pensions because means-tested beneﬁts
may be stigmatising. These latter beneﬁts may also discourage saving. Finally, they may undercut the
political support of the middle class for public pensions: targeted programs for the poor may result in poor
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way, the tax system can pool risks and shift these risks to those who can bear them
best.
Reducing PAYG beneﬁtsfor, and increasing the tax paymentsby, the more afﬂuent
elderly is consistent with the trend towards a more heterogeneous older population.
When PAYG schemes were established, the Second World War had impoverished
the older generation. Since poverty was thus concentrated among the elderly, poverty
alleviation called for transfers from the younger to the elder generation. At present,
in contrast, age is generally no longer a good indicator of poverty, because many el-
derly individuals have accumulated substantial ﬁnancial wealth, and more risks have
shifted to the beginning of the life cycle. Hence, information on age should increas-
ingly be supplemented by other information (in particular on incomes and family
status) to identify those most in need of income support.
The transition from a large PAYG system to a retirement system with a larger
funded component is difﬁcult. The generation that is retired when the transition is
started will not have been able to anticipate lower public PAYG beneﬁts. Moreover,
this generation will not be able to adjust easily because it has already depreciated
its human capital. Accordingly, a strong case can be made for changing the rules
of the game (i.e., reducing PAYG beneﬁts and increasing taxes on the elderly) only
gradually.3 Extensive grandfathering provisions protecting those who are currently
old are expensive. Indeed, grandfathering implies that younger generations have to
pay not only for their own funded beneﬁts but also for the public beneﬁts of the
currently old. To enhance conﬁdence and trust in a stable social contract while at the
same time facilitating timely adjustments, governments should announce as early as
possible any prospective changes in the social contract. This would allow the large
baby-boomgenerationstoanticipatereducedpublictransfersinretirementbystarting
to build up more funded pension provisions.
The need for more funding of pension schemes is widely recognized nowadays
in many countries that at present rely almost exclusively on PAYG ﬁnancing. Also
Eastern European countries and several emerging economies are developing a funded
pillar to supplement public PAYG systems. All of these countries have to develop
efﬁcient funded pension institutions that the population can trust. This constitutes a
major challenge. Indeed, the next subsection documents the way in which funded
corporate pension plans in the Anglo-Saxon world are crumbling, while Sect. 2.3
argues that individual DC schemes are often poorly designed.
2.2 Occupational deﬁned-beneﬁt systems
In traditional occupational DB plans, companies guarantee ﬁxed pension beneﬁts by
absorbing all ﬁnancial market and demographic risks. Years of service and a refer-
ence wage typically determine the beneﬁt entitlement. To illustrate, for every year of
service,theschemecouldofferapensionincomeof2%ofﬁnalsalaryafterretirement
until death.
These DB plans suffer from a number of shortcomings, which have contributed to
their demise in especially the Anglo-Saxon world:
3Relative PAYG beneﬁts can be reduced gradually by indexing beneﬁts to prices rather than wages.Developments in pension reform: the case of Dutch stand-alone 447
Fig. 1 Liabilities and premium base of Dutch pension funds, 1990–2030. Source: CPB Document 67, the
Hague, www.cpb.nl/nl/pub/cpbreeksen/document/67/doc67.pdf
– Inability of risk sponsor to absorb risk
– Incomplete contracts and ambiguous ownership of surplus
– Governance problems
– Back-loading of pension beneﬁts
– No tailor-made beneﬁts.
Each of these shortcomings will be discussed in turn.
Inability of risk sponsor to absorb risk Aging of the members4 of the pension funds
has expanded the obligations of the funds compared to the premium base (see Fig. 1).
This implies that unanticipated shocks in ﬁnancial markets and longevity require
larger changes in pension contributions in order to shield pension rights from these
shocks. Guaranteed pension obligations have thus become more expensive in that
they result in more volatility in pension contributions. Indeed, for many companies,
ﬁnancial and actuarial risks of pension guarantees start to dominate those of the core
business for many companies. They therefore no longer underwrite the risks of their
pension funds. Rather than becoming an insurer outﬁt, these companies choose to
focus on their core business.
Another reason why companies are less willing to provide guarantees to DB plans
is the increasingly competitive and dynamic world economy. More intense compe-
tition implies that companies exhibit shorter life spans and enjoy smaller rents with
which they can guarantee DB pensions. In a dynamic economy, constant innovation
results in substantial creative destruction. Firms can thus offer less security to their
employees. Indeed, deﬁned-beneﬁt promises increasingly end up being empty. Work-
ers end up as residual risk bearers because companies often are in trouble at the same
4A member of a fund has pension claims on the fund. A participant of a scheme pays contributions,
thereby accumulating pension rights.448 L. Bovenberg, T. Nijman
time that the pension fund is experiencing ﬁnancial distress. The probability that a
ﬁrm will experience periods of ﬁnancial stress during the long duration of pension
saving is substantial, especially in sectors facing intense international competition.
The increased bankruptcy risk of sponsoring companies in a dynamic, more compet-
itive economy implies that workers with DB claims are saddled with the substantial
credit risk of the company for which they work. Hence, the workers are exposed to
the risk of losing not only their job but also part of their pension if the company they
work for loses out in competition. They tie their fate to the ﬁrm as regards not only
their human capital but also their pension rights.
New accounting rules (FRS 17/IAS 19/FAS 87) are also stimulating companies
to get out of the pension insurance business. These new accounting regulations dis-
close pension risks assumed by companies, thereby enhancing transparency. More-
over, solvency regulations force pension funds to mark their obligations to market.
This enhances market discipline and facilitates better risk management. Most impor-
tantly, it enhances transparency by revealing the substantial costs of deﬁned-beneﬁt
obligations. Indeed, ad-hoc actuarial rules for discounting pension obligations have
in the past led to mispricing of pension guarantees.
Incomplete contracts and ambiguous ownership of surplus DB plans in effect of-
ten amount to incomplete contracts between the participants, the sponsor and the
fund because it is not clear in advance what happens in case of substantial under-
or overfunding. The identity of the ultimate risk bearer and the associated owner of
the surplus in the fund is thus ambiguous. This complicates the valuation of pension
rights when workers move between funds. Most importantly, it makes adequate bal-
ancing of the interests of the various stakeholders difﬁcult. Indeed, the ambiguity of
ownership and the associated risk-sharing arrangements are likely to give rise to addi-
tional risks and conﬂicts after substantial shocks occur, which may lead to litigation.
Making explicit agreements about how risks are shared before these shocks actually
materialize (i.e. implementing state-contingent rules ex ante) allows for contracts that
are advantageous for all parties (i.e. giving up resources in one contingency is traded
for receiving resources in another contingency).5 After the shock (i.e. ex post, when
the contingency that actually materializes is known), in contrast, one of the parties
has to give up resources for the beneﬁt of the others. Insurance (and mutual advanta-
geous trade) then becomes redistribution (in which the beneﬁt for one party amounts
to a cost for the other).
Governance problems The ambiguous ownership of the surplus of corporate DB
plans gives rise to governance problems (see Boeri et al. 2006). If it is not quite clear
to whom the surplus in the fund belongs, it is also not clear whose interest the fund
should serve: the interests of the workers or those of the shareholders of the company.
5In designing state-contingent rules, pension funds face a trade-off between commitment and ﬂexibility.
On the one hand, pension funds may want to create clarity ex ante with regard to the way in which risks
are shared, for the reasons described in the main text. On the other hand, funds may prefer to leave some
discretionary powers so that they can respond to unforeseen contingencies. This latter ﬂexibility implicit
in incomplete contracts requires, however, that participants trust the governing board to act in the ﬁduciary
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Indeed, a potential conﬂict of interest between these stakeholders may arise in setting
the investment portfolio. This conﬂict may hurt the workers if their interests are not
well represented on the governing board of the fund. To illustrate, just as the other
holders of corporate debt, the members of the fund have in fact written a put option to
the shareholders of the ﬁrm. By encouraging the fund to invest more in risky assets,
ﬁrms that face substantial bankruptcy risk can increase the value of this put option for
the shareholders of the ﬁrm at the expense of the other stakeholders of the pension
fund (see, e.g., Kocken 2006). In this way, the shareholders of the ﬁrm, who enjoy
limited liability, can reap the upside of the returns on the assets in the pension fund
but can shift the risks of the downside to the members of the pension fund.
Back-loading of pension beneﬁts Many DB pension plans are back-loaded. This
means that most workers accumulate most of their pension rights at the end of their
working career, while the pension contribution paid by themselves or by their em-
ployer on their behalf is not age-dependent. The back-loading of beneﬁts results
in all kinds of distortions. In particular, it is unattractive for older workers to leave
the scheme, for example by becoming self-employed. More generally, it inhibits the
portabilityofpensionrightsifpeopleengageinvarioustransitionsinthelabourlabour
market. Lack of portability has often been emphasized as a major drawback of DB
schemes (see, e.g., Munnell and Sunden 2006).
Back-loading increases the credit risks faced by workers who in effect hold an
implicit claim on the ﬁrm they work for. If a ﬁrm has to lay off middle-aged workers,
this ﬁrm in effect defaults on its implicit promise to buy additional pension rights for
these workers when they are older. Indeed, back-loading implies that workers tie their
fate more closely to that of the ﬁrm. To better diversify risks (credit risks, in partic-
ular), workers should invest their pension saving in the capital market rather than in
the ﬁrm for which they work. Back-loading thus seems increasingly inappropriate in
a ﬂexible transitional labourlabour market in which people and ﬁrms experience sub-
stantial idiosyncratic shocks in part due to a dynamic, competitive world economy.
No tailor-made beneﬁts DB plans typically assume that the characteristics and pref-
erences of all participants in the scheme are similar. These schemes implement one-
size-ﬁts-all solutions without considering the heterogeneity in the pool of partici-
pants. Traditional DB plans thus leave little scope for tailoring the pension product to
personal characteristics or preferences. If the provided pension income exceeds what
the worker prefers, this worker cannot undo this by taking out individual, supple-
mentary products. The worker also often lacks the expertise and the access to capital
markets to undo investment policies that are not tailored to his individual-speciﬁc risk
appetite.
2.3 Individual DC plans
Governments are reducing their role in pension insurance in many countries. Indeed,
Sect. 2.1 argued that public PAYG schemes should focus more on alleviating poverty
rather than on providing earnings-related old-age insurance to the population at large.
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plans. As a result, in many countries, individuals have to resort to individual DC
plans. In these plans, individuals themselves are responsible for planning how much
to save for retirement, how to invest their savings in the capital market and beneﬁt
optimally from risk premia without running excessive risks, and how to insure indi-
vidual longevity risk by converting pension capital into annuity income.
IndividualDCplans,however,typicallysuffer from thefollowingimportantweak-
nesses, which we will discuss below:
– Inadequate individual decision making
– Agency problems and lack of buying power
– Inadequate product design
– Inadequate risk management resulting in conversion risk
– High expenses
– Lack of ﬁnancial instruments
– Imperfect annuity products and markets.
Inadequate individual decision making Households typically lack the basic ﬁnan-
cial knowledge and computational ability to implement ﬁnancial life-cycle planning
involving saving levels, risk management, portfolio decisions, and life and annuity
insurance (see Lusardi and Mitchell 2006; and van Rooij et al. 2006). Inadequate de-
cision making by individuals gives rise to inadequate saving rates, under-diversiﬁed
stock portfolios or investments in own company stock, as well as to leakage and lapse
behavior. Munnell and Sunden (2006) document that many individuals exercise the
option to withdraw their 401(k) savings as a lump sum when they change jobs. This
signiﬁcantly reduces their retirement savings. Blake (2008) presents evidence on in-
efﬁcient lapse behavior in British DC schemes. This suggests that the products that
were initially contracted were inadequate.
Agency problems and lack of buying power Financial illiteracy combined with the
nature of the pension products as an experience good gives rise to serious agency
issues, as households have to delegate these complex decisions to professionals and
ﬁnancial institutions, which do not necessarily act in the interests of their clients.
Individuals lack the expertise and the buying power to discipline these institutions.
The risks of misselling are thus substantial.
Inadequate product design Individuals who participate in DC plans typically face a
bewildering array of choice. In Sweden, for example, investors choose mutual funds
from an ofﬁcial list of more than 600 funds. It is by now well documented that peo-
ple cannot handle such an enormous choice set and that people need to be assisted
in order to be able to make good choices—through, for example, good defaults or
structured choice (see, e.g., Bernatzi and Thaler 2007).
Inadequate risk management resulting in conversion risk DC products are typically
designed as pure saving products aimed at wealth accumulation instead of as pen-
sion products focused on providing income during retirement. Accordingly, during
the accumulation phase, interest-rate, longevity and inﬂation risks are not managed
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to generate sufﬁcient real income during the remaining lifetime. The risky level of
the interest rate at retirement is thus an important determinant of the income that is
available during retirement. Hence, individuals face substantial so-called conversion
risk when they convert their pension capital into an annuity.
High expenses Administrative and investment costs charged by the provider of the
DC plan can seriously erode the value of pension entitlements in view of the long
average duration of pension investments. Indeed, the average duration of a typical
pension investment is 25 years. For such an investment, a difference in annual costs
of one percentage point reduces pension income by about a quarter. The literature
(see Bikker and de Dreu 2007, Buetler and Ruesch 2007, Table 6 and Andersen and
Skjodt 2007, Tables 9–11) suggests that the costs of individual DC products exceed
the costs of schemes provided by occupation pension funds plans by a substantial
margin, namely by 50 to 100 basis points.6 In this connection, Blake (2008) empha-
sizes that lapse behavior gives rise to the high costs of DC plans.
Lack of ﬁnancial instruments Other asset categories than stocks and bonds can be
quite attractive for pension provision because these asset classes can help to hedge
inﬂation risk, which is one of the most important risks faced by long-term investors.
These asset classes include real estate, hedge funds, private equity and infrastructure.
Unfortunately, such investments are usually not available in individual DC plans be-
cause they require speciﬁc expertise and investment size.
A related point is that speciﬁc risk factors are simply not (yet) traded in ﬁnancial
markets. Macro longevity risk due to increases in overall life expectancy is an impor-
tant example. Moreover, various important macro-economic risks, such a standard-
of-living risk, are not yet traded on ﬁnancial markets (see Shiller 2003). Such risks
may be traded between the various generations in an occupational DB plan. An indi-
vidual DC plan, in contrast, cannot hedge these risks on the capital market.
Imperfect annuity products and markets The academic literature provides strong ar-
guments that a substantial fraction of retirement wealth should be held in the form
of annuities, provided that a rich set of annuities is offered. The optimal asset menu
contains not only nominal annuities, but also real annuities, which hedge inﬂation
risks, and variable annuities, which allow individuals to exploit the equity premium.
In the presence of habit formation, also escalating annuities are part of the optimal
portfolio. These various types of annuities are typically not available (or if they are
available they may involve substantial costs). One reason is a lack of demand re-
lated to ﬁnancial illiteracy. The literature shows that few people annuitize if they are
given the option to take a lump sum, unless they face strong recommendations and
incentives to annuitize (see e.g. Butler and Teppa 2007). Annuity markets in many
countries are poorly developed as a result of not only ﬁnancial illiteracy of house-
holds but also adverse selection due to heterogeneous longevity risk (see Finkelstein
and Poterba 2004).
6It is not always clear, however, whether these data always include all costs incurred by employers.
Munnell and Sunden (2006) argue that employers prefer DC over DB schemes because of administra-
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3 Occupational pension funds in the Netherlands
Collectivestand-alonepensionplansbasedoncapitalfundingofferanappealingthird
way between the individual DC plans and the corporate DB plans. As the second
pillar of the Dutch pension system, sectoral occupational pension schemes have been
evolving in the direction of stand-alone pension funds. This section describes the
Dutch pension system in general and the occupational pension schemes in particular.
Dutch pension system The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The ﬁrst
pillar is a pay-as-you-go public pension scheme. It provides a basic ﬂat pension to all
older residents at a level that is related to the minimum wage. Compared to other EU
countries, the state pension in the Netherlands provides only a relatively small part
of pension income for those workers earning middle and higher incomes. If these
workers want to maintain their standard of living in retirement, they need additional
pension income. This is where the second pillar comes in. The third pillar consists of
voluntary personal savings, which are tax favored up to a ceiling. This pillar can be
used to tailor the pension portfolio to individual preferences and characteristics, and
is especially important for self-employed individuals who lack occupational pension
provisions.
Occupational pension schemes The second pillar involves occupational funded
pension schemes. These schemes are earnings-related and supplement the ﬂat pub-
lic beneﬁt for workers who earn more than the minimum wage. These schemes
cover more than 90% of the labour force. The pension scheme is part of the labour
contract, which is typically negotiated between unions and employers in collective
labour agreements. Employees are thus obliged to participate in the negotiated pen-
sion scheme. The value of assets in the second pillar amounts to about 125% of GDP.
Industry-wide pension funds are organized for workers in a speciﬁc sector of the
economy. These sectoral funds own more than two-thirds of the assets in the second
pillar and account for more than 80% of the active participants.
The institutional set-up of labour relationships and the pension system gives
unions a strong position, even though unions organize only about a quarter of work-
ers. In particular, collective labour agreements negotiated between employer orga-
nizations and unions are extended to all employers and workers in a sector. This
mandatory extension also extends to industry pension schemes and the industry pen-
sion fund that administers these funds and that works exclusively for the sector con-
cerned. A company can opt out of an industry fund only if it offers a better pension
plan than the plan offered by the sectoral fund.7 The mandatory extension of occupa-
tional pension schemes explains the high coverage of supplementary pensions in the
Netherlands.
7In terms of active participants, the most important other type of pension fund is a company pension fund.
A company, however, does not have to set up its own company pension fund but can also contract out the
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Guarantees and ambitions The occupational plans are run like DB plans, which
aim at a certain annuity level during retirement. Years of service and a reference
wage typically determine the beneﬁt entitlement. The reference wage used to be the
ﬁnal wage but in recent years most funds have moved to career-average schemes. In
these schemes, entitlements to deferred annuities accrue based on a percentage of
the average wage level during the career. These schemes typically aim at an annuity
level of about 80% of average pay (including the ﬂat public beneﬁt) after 40 years of
service. This corresponds to an accrual rate of about 2% per year.
The aspired annuity levels are ambitions rather than guarantees. In particular, the
pension funds aim to index the pension rights to prices or wages, but this indexation is
not guaranteed because indexation is conditional on the ﬁnancial performance of the
fund. One can in fact view the system as a hybrid system of guaranteesand ambitions;
nominal annuities are guaranteed, but the degree to which pensions rise in line with
pricesandwagesdependsontheperformanceoftheinvestmentsofthepensionfunds.
Through the shift from ﬁnal-pay to career-average schemes with conditional in-
dexation of nominal pension rights, pension funds have made indexation conditional
on the ﬁnancial performance of the pension fund. Conditional indexation in these
career-average schemes applies not only to the pension rights of the already retired
members but also to the indexation of the pension rights of the active members. These
reforms have thus strengthened the steering capacity of the indexation instrument be-
cause the indexation of all accrued liabilities (including the entitlements of active
members to deferred annuities) now depends on the solvency position of the fund.
As a result of these reforms, those in the active working population absorb more
risks in terms of their pension rights. Moreover, members rather than participants and
employers have become the main risk bearers of the fund.
More complete contracts Several large sectoral pension funds now employ policy
ladders—rules that state explicitly how both the extent of indexation of pension rights
andapossiblerecoverypremium(leviedontopofthecost-basedpremiaforthenewly
accumulated pension beneﬁts) vary with the solvency ratio, which is deﬁned as the
ratio of the market value of the assets to the market value of the nominal liabilities
of the pension fund. These policy ladders can be viewed as more complete contracts
compared to the previous rather incomplete ones, which allowed for a great deal of
discretion by the governing board. Indeed, in the past, funds would make only rather
ambiguous statements that pension rights would be indexed as long as the ﬁnancial
position of the fund would allow it.
A policy ladder for a typical Dutch pension fund is shown in Fig. 2, which is
adapted from Ponds and van Riel (2007). The horizontal axis measures the market
value of the assets of the pension fund. The extent to which pension rights are in-
dexed to inﬂation as well as the contribution level depends on where the market value
of the assets is relative to a lower and upper threshold. The lower threshold LN typi-
cally corresponds approximately to the market value of the nominal liabilities of the
pension fund, while the upper threshold LR measures the value of indexed annuities.8
8The market value of the nominal liabilities is computed on the basis of the nominal swap curve, assuming
standard actuarial survival tables adjusted for projected longevity changes. The upper limit of the policy454 L. Bovenberg, T. Nijman
Fig. 2 Typical policy ladder of Dutch pension fund. Source: Ponds and van Riel (2007)
The left vertical axis measures the actual extent of inﬂation indexation of the pen-
sion rights. This actual inﬂation indexation depends on comparing the actual inﬂation
indexation reserve A−LN to the inﬂation indexation reserve that is required to fully
meet the ambition to index the pension rights to inﬂation, LR − LN. If the actual
indexation reserve is positive but less than the reserve needed to fully meet the aspi-
rations (i.e. LN <A<L R), then actual inﬂation protection is provided in proportion
to the actual inﬂation indexation reserve A − LN as a share of the required inﬂation
indexation reserve LR − LN. If the actual inﬂation indexation reserve exceeds the
required reserve, then the pension fund may provide so-called catch-up inﬂation in-
dexation to make up for missed inﬂation indexation in the past. The dotted line in
Fig. 2 depicts this possibility.
The left vertical axis of Fig. 2 also measures the contribution rate. The base con-
tribution rate is calculated as the market value of the hybrid pension claims that are
acquired by the active participants (i.e. a nominal DB guarantee and a risky DC claim
involving inﬂation indexation). An additional so-called recovery premium may be
charged if the actual indexation reserve lies below the required indexation reserve.
If a recovery premium complements conditional inﬂation indexation, the plan can be
viewed as a hybrid DB-DC plan.
Whether the fund levies recovery premia or grants catch-up indexation is up to the
discretion of the governing board of the pension fund. In fact, the policy ladder is
merely a guideline. The governing board can thus deviate from this guideline.
Stand-alone pension funds Dutch pension funds are independent trusts with their
own governance and administrative structures. The governing board of a pension
ladder LR is typically based on an approximation to the real yield curve, using estimates of expected Dutch
price inﬂation and assuming that inﬂation risk would not be priced. Index-linked bonds related to Dutch
inﬂation are not traded. Hence, direct market-based estimates of the real yield curve are not available.Developments in pension reform: the case of Dutch stand-alone 455
fund consists of equal representatives of employers and unions. On the one hand,
employers thus do not dominate decision-making. On the other hand, they are not
exclusively responsible for correcting any underfunding.
In fact, in the newly emerging risk-sharing contracts, participants of the pension
fund bear most risks in terms of their pension rights. Pension funds are relying more
and more on the indexation instrument and less and less on the instrument of ﬂuc-
tuating recovery pension contributions to absorb risk. The main reason is that aging
and the maturation of pension funds makes recovery contributions a less effective in-
strument to maintain the solvency of pension funds. With a rising ratio of pensioners
to workers, pension liabilities are increasing compared to wages (i.e. the contribu-
tion rate) so that large changes in contributions are required to contain ﬂuctuations in
liabilities pension beneﬁts (see Fig. 1 and Sect. 2.2).
Moreover, the costs of volatile contributions are increasingly being recognized in
terms of adverse demand- and supply-side effects. In particular, ﬂuctuating recovery
premia are likely to affect the demand side of the economy in a pro-cyclical fashion.
As regards the supply side, the ﬂuctuating pension contributions distort the labour
market. Indeed, higher pension contributions aimed at correcting funding deﬁcits act
as an implicit tax on labour.9
In view of these considerations, pension funds rely more on the indexation in-
strument rather than the premium level as a steering device. Indeed, as indicated
above, the shift from ﬁnal-pay to career-average systems with conditional indexa-
tion of nominal pension rights implies that workers bear risk more in terms of the
value of their pension rights. Rather than those who pay the premium (i.e. employ-
ers and/or employees as participants), the members of a pension fund (i.e. those who
have pension rights) are the main residual risk bearers. This change helps to alleviate
labour-market distortions but also implies that young generations who have not yet
accumulated many pension rights share less in the risks taken on by the pension fund.
4 Strengths of the Dutch occupational schemes
Section 2 discussed the main disadvantages of both traditional occupational DB
schemes and individual DC schemes. This section argues that Dutch occupational
schemes circumvent many of these drawbacks. The main strengths of the Dutch oc-
cupational schemes, which are discussed in the rest of this section in turn, are the
following:
– Stand-alone funds owned by members without credit risk sponsor
– Adequate defaults
9If more workers are mobile across sectors, workers are able to shift the burden of the implicit tax to others,
such as consumers in non-tradable sectors or shareholders in tradable sectors facing intense international
competition. In that case, ﬁrms thus bear (part of) the risks of the fund in the form of risky wage costs,
even though they do not pay the statutory contributions. Workers are more likely to be able to easily leave
companies than sectors. Accordingly, companies with a company pension fund are likely to bear more
investment risk through risky contributions and wage costs than companies who participate in sectoral
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– Governance on behalf of members
– Advanced risk management
– Low expenses, substantial buying power and reduced selection
– Completion of ﬁnancial markets and intergenerational risk sharing
– Advanced pension communication.
Stand-alone funds owned by members without credit risk sponsor Dutch sectoral
funds are stand alone in the sense that they lack a risk-absorbing sponsor. Pension
funds face a hard budget constraint so that the members of these cooperative schemes
become the explicit risk bearers: they have to either share risks among themselves
or shift risks to others by trading ﬁnancial instruments on capital markets or by con-
tracting with insurance companies. An important advantage of stand-alone coopera-
tive schemes compared to traditional corporate DB plans is that members do not bear
the credit risk of a sponsoring company. Moreover, the ownership of the assets lies
unambiguously with the members. The pension funds are cooperatives that explicitly
aim to further the interests of the participants. Indeed, one can view the pension funds
as mutual insurance companies that are owned by the policyholders instead of outside
shareholders. Companies do not have a claim on a possible surplus in the cooperative
fund. They are thus not tempted to increase the risk proﬁle of their pension fund in
order to maximize the return on the company’s equity at the expense of the members’
ﬁduciary interest.
Adequate defaults Empirical research shows the importance of defaults (i.e. what
happens if people do not choose themselves) in pension insurance. Defaults are im-
portant for the premium level, for portfolio selection and for the way in which the
pension is paid out. Defaults are so powerful because ﬁnancially illiterate individuals
see the default as an implicit recommendation for a complex product that they do not
fully understand. In cooperative pension plans in the Netherlands, the broad portfolio
composition and the type of annuity are determined by the board of trustees, while
the premium level is set in close consultation with the social partners who negoti-
ate collective labour agreements. The individual members thus cannot opt out of the
collective arrangements. In recent years, individuals have been given more individual
discretion to select their retirement date and to choose between an individual or a
joint-life annuity. Dutch pensions are paid out as annuities because health-care costs
are insured through compulsory private and public insurances. Hence, Dutch house-
holds face only limited idiosyncratic risks, so that illiquid annuities are an attractive
option to insure longevity risk.
Cooperative pension plans allow individuals with scarce cognitive abilities to del-
egate complex saving, investment and insurance decisions to professionals. Collec-
tive pension funds assist individuals in properly exploiting their long-run investment
horizon and in gaining access to complex investment strategies provided by modern
ﬁnancial markets. More sophisticated life-cycle investment by pension funds on be-
half of long-term investors stabilizes ﬁnancial markets and facilitates macroeconomic
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Governance on behalf of members Restricting individual choice protects ﬁnancially
illiterate individuals with scarce cognitive abilities from making mistakes in complex
intertemporal ﬁnancial decisions under uncertainty, but gives rise to agency issues
and problems associated with collective decision-making. Governance arrangements
shouldthusaddressprincipal-agentissuesthatariseifunsophisticatedconsumersdel-
egate complex ﬁnancial decisions to professionals. Members should have conﬁdence
that the trustees take delegated decisions in the interests of the members so that a cer-
tain lack of individual choice remains legitimate. In this connection, the non-proﬁt
character of pension funds organized as trusts can bolster the conﬁdence of the par-
ticipants and members that pension funds act in their interests. Indeed, the members
themselves are the shareholders of the pension funds, thereby preventing a conﬂict of
interest between policyholders and shareholders.10
Advanced risk management The Dutch occupational pension plans aim at achiev-
ing the ambition of a DB promise of an appropriate income level during retirement.
In particular, the pension fund manages interest-rate and inﬂation risks so as to guar-
antee the nominal annuities and to realize its ambition to index these annuities to
inﬂation. Hence, the main risks (e.g. investment risk, inﬂation risk, interest-rate risk
and longevity risk) are managed so as to hedge risks on behalf of households while
at the same time exploiting the risk premia on various risk factors by optimizing the
trade-off between return and risk.
An important technique for managing the various risks optimally is so-called
asset-liability management (ALM). Based on stochastic simulations of the various
risk factors, ALM studies simulate the probability distributions of pension income
and contribution rates under alternative policy scenarios in terms of asset mix, con-
tribution policy and indexation rules. The contribution and investment strategies are
then optimized on the basis of these ALM techniques.
Low expenses, substantial buying power and reduced selection Cooperative pen-
sion funds with compulsory participation of members reduce marketing and other
transaction costs. The board of trustees can contract out various ﬁnancial services to
insurance companies, hedge funds or mutual funds. Accordingly, competition occurs
on a wholesale level rather than a retail level. This tends to reduce transaction costs
for individual members, who typically lack sufﬁcient expertise to buy the various
services that make up the pension product. Moreover, joining forces in a cooperative
pension fund that is run professionally strengthens the buying power of individuals,
exploits scale economies in buying complex ﬁnancial products that are not available
to individual investors, and helps to discipline commercial ﬁnancial service providers
to act in the interests of the members of the pension fund. Another advantage of
10At the same time, non-for proﬁt organizations have to deal with several difﬁcult governance issues (see
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forced risk pooling in a sectoral pension fund is that it reduces selection in longevity
insurance. Also this helps to reduce the costs of pension insurance.
Completion of ﬁnancial markets and intergenerational risk sharing Collective risk
pooling not only combats selection in longevity insurance but also allows members
to exchange risks that are not (yet) traded in ﬁnancial markets. In particular, young
members can share in longevity risks faced by older cohorts. To illustrate, if these
cohorts live longer than expected, the resulting lower funding rate affects the indexa-
tion quality of the deferred annuities of the younger cohorts. In this way, the pension
schemes help to ﬁll the gaps of incomplete ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, by linking
pension beneﬁts to the wages of workers, pension funds allow retirees to share in
the wage risks of workers. Furthermore, young workers can share in ﬁnancial market
risks faced by the older members through so-called recovery contributions. Indeed, in
a scheme that indexes beneﬁts to prices and carries mismatch risk because of invest-
ments in risk-bearing assets, the active participants (i.e. the workers who pay con-
tributions into the fund) in effect borrow from the older, retired members by issuing
price-indexed bonds to these older members and use the funds to invest in the risk-
bearing assets.11 In fact, the risky pension contributions produced by the mismatch
risk allow the young to transform their human capital into an asset with exposure to
ﬁnancial risks (see Beetsma and Bovenberg 2008).
In principle, one can share ﬁnancial-market shocks not only between currently
living generations but also with generations that are not yet participating in the pen-
sion scheme when the shocks actually materialize. In fact, the pension fund buys
risk-bearing assets on behalf of future generations by in effect borrowing from older
generations. From an ex-ante point of view, this internal trade is actually welfare im-
proving because ﬁnancial shocks are shared even more broadly, namely not only with
the currently participating generations but also with future generations (see Teulings
and de Vries 2006).
Advanced pension communication Communicating the occupational pension rights
to the individuals concerned has become more important for a number of reasons.
First of all, members bear more risks in terms of their pension rights as contributions
have become a less effective instrument to buffer risks. As residual risk bearers in
pension plans, members should be informed about what macro-economic risks they
face so that they can take this into account in their own ﬁnancial planning. Second,
idiosyncratic risks have increased on account of more frequent so-called life events,
which may be due to changes in the household composition (e.g. divorce) or transi-
tions on a more dynamic labour market (e.g. changing jobs, moving from a full-time
to a part-time job, becoming self-employed). These life events tend to have major
consequences for actual and desired pension insurance. A ﬁnal reason for the in-
creased importance of pension communication is that individuals are confronted with
more choices, such as the choice about the type of annuity people want to receive
(e.g. individual versus joint-life annuities, timing of retirement, the possibility to buy
11In the absence of pension funds, borrowing constraints and other capital-market imperfections are likely
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additional pension rights by paying additional individual premiums, whether or not
to transfer pension rights to another pension fund in case of a job move into another
sector).
Fortunately, improved information and communication technology helps to better
communicate the features of pension contracts and individual pension rights that have
been accumulated. To illustrate, a so-called indexation label is being developed that
measures the indexation quality of a pension scheme in terms of the expectation and
the standard deviation of the extent to which the pension’s rights will be indexed.
As another example, by 2011, a so-called web-based pension register should provide
individuals with up-to-date comprehensive information on all their pension rights in
the ﬁrst- and second pillars. This pension register will be extended later to include
also third-pillar products.
5 Remaining challenges facing Dutch pension funds
As the second pillar of the Dutch pension system, Dutch sectoral pension schemes
have been evolving in the direction of stand-alone pension funds. This section dis-
cusses the following major remaining challenges facing the Dutch pension funds:
– Make contracts on risk sharing complete
– Improve risk sharing between cohorts
– Reduce backloading of beneﬁts
– Link retirement age to longevity
– Increase ﬂexibility labour market
– Develop tailor-made policies
– Extend life-cycle ﬁnancial planning
– Improve governance.
Complete contracts on risk sharing As argued in Sect. 2.2, making explicit agree-
ments about how risks are shared before the shocks actually materialize prevents
costly political conﬂicts when the shocks hit. Although pension funds have strived to
make risk-sharing contracts more complete through policy ladders (see Sect. 3 and,
in particular, Diagram 1), further improvements are possible. To illustrate, the current
policy ladders tend to be silent on what happens in case the funding rate (i.e. assets as
a percentage of the nominal liabilities) falls below 105% or rises above the level that
is necessary to ﬁnance fully indexed pensions. The policy ladders are also incomplete
in the sense that they do not specify investment decisions. By changing investment
decisions, governing boards can redistribute resources among the various stakehold-
ers of the fund, depending on the various options that are written by the stakeholders
of the fund (see Hoevenaars and Ponds 2006). Finally, policy ladders are at present
not more than guidelines for the governing board. They have therefore no legal status
and thus do not offer the same protection as legal property rights do.
Improve risk sharing between cohorts The current risk-sharing arrangements in the
Dutch pension funds could be improved further. Efﬁcient risk sharing implies that an460 L. Bovenberg, T. Nijman
adverse shock causes consumption of all agents to decline by the same percentage.12
Risks are thus shared as broadly as possible. With permanent income determining
consumption, everybody’s wealth should thus decline by the same percentage after
a negative shock. The most important components of aggregate wealth of individu-
als are pension wealth, housing wealth, and human wealth (i.e. the discounted value
of future labour income). For younger workers, human wealth is the most important
wealth component. For older members, in contrast, pension rights account for most
of individual wealth. In fact, retirees have (almost) completely depreciated their hu-
man capital. Hence, in order to achieve the same relative change in overall wealth for
all cohorts (as required by optimal risk sharing), the pension wealth of young cohorts
should ﬂuctuate more than that of older generations if a shock hits the pension funds.
By adapting pension rights in this way, one can shift ﬁnancial and demographic risks
to younger generations without having to rely on the recovery premium instrument.13
Whereas pension rights for younger generations are relatively uncertain (i.e. the sys-
tem resembles a DC system), pension rights are less risky for the elderly. As indi-
viduals grow older, they thus transform their DC claims into DB claims. The gradual
transformation of deﬁned-contribution claims into deﬁned-beneﬁt claims as individ-
uals grow older is consistent with optimal investment behavior over the life cycle (see
Bodie et al. 1992). Young agents invest more in risk-bearing assets because most of
their wealth consists of less risky human capital. As agents grow older, they move
more into secure assets, which are preferably also protected against inﬂation (see
Teulings and de Vries 2006).
The current Dutch occupational pension plans impose uniform investmentsand in-
dexation rules on all participants. Accordingly, cohorts do not share risks optimally,
especially if pension funds can rely less on ﬂuctuating contribution rates to imple-
ment intergenerational risk sharing. Large Dutch pension plans are currently inves-
tigating whether indexation rules can be differentiated across age groups. Younger
generations can then take more risks on their pension savings and beneﬁt from the
associated risk premiums, whereas the contract for the elderly is geared primarily
towards protection of the purchasing power of the pension entitlements (see, e.g.,
Munsters et al. 2008).
These reforms can be complemented by more ﬂexibility in tailor-made premium
rates. In fact, this allows agents to bear more risks and thus to beneﬁt more from
the rewards to risk taking. Indeed, after an expected shock, it is optimal to adjust
consumption levels during the rest of one’s lifetime. In effect, this involves spreading
the risks over the longest possible recovery period. Hence, pension schemes may
12This assumes that all agents feature the same constant relative risk aversion and that utility is time-
separable and separable in consumption of commodities and leisure. More generally, optimal risk sharing
implies that everybody’s marginal utility changes with the same percentage after a shock hits. See Bohn
(2005).
13This assumes that pension wealth does not become negative to produce the required relative change in
overall wealth. For young households, this may happen if shocks are adverse in the beginning of their
working life. To prevent this happening, these households should buy call options to get the optimal expo-
sure to stock-market risk. If these instruments are not available, recovery premia may be used to expose
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levyindividual-speciﬁcpensioncontributions,dependingontheshocksthataspeciﬁc
individual has experienced throughout his or her lifetime. The pension scheme may
thusaskforavoluntary,individualincreaseinthepremiumafteranagenthassuffered
several adverse shocks. Alternatively, it may set such an increase in the premium as a
default. In that case, an individual can then always opt out of this premium increase.
The hybrid system of both DC and DB elements can be viewed as a pension fund
that has on the liability side of its balance sheet both soft equity claims (or junior
claims) and hard debt claims (or senior claims). The active members who are not yet
retired, and especially the young members who still have substantial human capital,
hold most of the soft claims and are thus in fact the residual risk bearers of the fund.
The retired generations own more secure claims in the form of debt.14 The young
agents are in fact the owners of an insurance company that protects older members
against old-age risks if the pension fund has not matched the guaranteed pension
rights of the older generations on the capital market. The claims on this insurance
outﬁt are not traded on capital markets, but are assigned to agents depending on the
nature of their work effort on the labour market.
Dutch pension funds already make a distinction between hard and soft claims.
However, the hard rights (i.e. the guarantees) are usually deﬁned in nominal rather
than real terms. The Dutch pension system (and the pension rights of young agents
with a longer investment horizon in particular) is thus vulnerable to inﬂation now that
pension funds are tempted to match these nominal obligations with nominal assets.15
Moreover, these hard rights are granted to all members, irrespective of their char-
acteristics (such as age).16 The solvency rules in the Dutch risk-based supervisory
framework in fact focus on the hard rather than the soft pension rights, which typi-
cally involve the ambition of the pension funds to index pension rights to prices or
even wages. Hence, capital funding does not necessarily extend also to soft pension
rights.
Reduce back-loading of beneﬁts The beneﬁts in the Dutch occupational pension
plans are currently heavily back-loaded: the pension fund charges the same price for
a deferred annuity for all age groups even though the money that is contributed on
behalf of the young will be paid out later and thus can yield a higher overall return.
This lack of market pricing implicit in the uniform pricing of deferred annuities im-
plies that the young are taxed on their working effort while the old are subsidized.
The transition from ﬁnal-pay to career-average has increased back-loading. Under the
ﬁnal-pay system, the rights accumulated in the beginning of the career could become
14The retired generations may still ﬁnd it optimal to have some exposure to stock-market and longevity
risk. Koijen et al. (2006) ﬁnd that with plausible parameter values, retired agents should hold 20% of
their pension wealth in equity. In fact, in the simplest model with homogeneous and constant relative risk
aversion and no mean reversion of stock returns, all generations hold the same share of overall wealth in
equity (see Bovenberg et al. 2007).
15For maturities of over 35 years, inﬂation risk is persistent and thus substantial over a long horizon.
Campbell and Viceira (2005) report that the annualised standard deviation of real returns on nominal
bonds is as large as 8% and exceeds that of stocks.
16The ratio of soft to hard pension rights, however, is especially large for young participants because of
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valuable if one experienced substantial wage increases during one’s career. This is no
longer the case under the career-average system.
Burdening intergenerational risk sharing with predictable redistribution due to
back-loading makes the pension system less robust: the pension scheme faces a larger
discontinuity risk. In particular, younger agents may leave the system if they are con-
fronted with substantial recovery premia. Indeed, the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) ﬁnanc-
ingimplicitintheback-loadingoftheﬁnancingofbeneﬁtsmakesthepensionscheme
less well funded (and thus more vulnerable to political risks) than appears from the
ofﬁcial funding rate.17
Recently, proposals have been put forward to continue to levy the same uniform
pension contribution for all participants but to assign pension rights that are actu-
arially fair (see, e.g., Boeijen et al. 2007). Addressing the back-loading of beneﬁt
accumulation and marking pension premia to market (in the sense that the premium
paid corresponds to the value of the additional pension rights accumulated) is compli-
cated by the fact that it creates the familiar transitional burden of moving from PAYG
to full funding. Possible solutions include using collective buffers or asking sponsors
who want to get rid of the risk to pay a one-time fee for transferring these risks to their
younger workers. In any case, a long transition period will allow pension schemes to
gradually implement two-sided solidarity between the young and the old.18
Link retirement age to longevity A longer life expectancy raises the length of the
inactive period that needs to be ﬁnanced. Hence, increased longevity puts ﬁnancial
stress on not only pay-as-you-go-schemes but also funded pension schemes. To pre-
ventthisstressonfundedpensionsystems,longerlifeexpectancyforcohortsyounger
than 65 years of age must go together with a higher retirement age (or lower annual
beneﬁts) for the cohorts concerned if lower mortality is associated with lower mor-
bidity and thus more human capital. If these shocks materialize only at older ages
at which the cohort has already depreciated its human capital, then younger cohorts
(who exhibit a longer horizon and more ﬂexibility to adapt) should optimally share a
larger part of these risks. A collective pension scheme can implement this particular
way of sharing risks between generations. In particular, the pension fund can promise
an annuity to retirees while at the same time making the pension rights of the active
members conditional on the capital that remains available after meeting these obliga-
tions to the retirees. The pension fund then in fact issues longevity bonds on behalf of
the active members to the retired members. In this way, pension funds in effect create
new non-tradable assets that are not yet available on ﬁnancial markets.
17The funding rate underestimates the implicit obligations to middle-aged workers who have in effect paid
premia in advance without having received the equivalent market value in pension claims. These workers
expect to receive a subsidy from younger workers in the second half of their working life. In other words,
they have an implicit claim on the pension fund that is not taken into account when computing the funding
rate. Boeijen et al. (2007) estimate that the implicit obligation of PGGM due to back-loading of beneﬁt
accumulation is in the order of 15% of the PGGM’s current nominal obligations.
18Another alternative is to extend the tax on youngsters and the subsidy on old workers from employees
alsototheselfemployed.Thiswouldalleviatethedrawbacksofback-loadingfordomestic labourmobility.
These explicit age-speciﬁc transfers could gradually be phased out as older workers get a stronger labour-
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In addition to stimulating ﬁnancial innovation, liquid markets for longevity-
indexed bonds would help to establish objective market prices for longevity risk.
This would assist regulators and help pension funds in setting the terms of trade for
internal risk trading between generations. Moreover, longevity bonds would allow
members of a pension fund to trade not only with other members in the same fund
but also with capital-market participants more generally. Indeed, there is a strong the-
oretical case for developing macro-markets for such contingent securities (see Shiller
2003).
In theory, governments can be providers of longevity bonds, as they are in a good
position to shift this risk onto future and younger generations. These generations may
best be able to absorb these risks through a longer working life associated with more
human-capital investment. Governments, however, already bear substantial longevity
risk on their balance sheets through public pay-as-you-go systems. Indeed, govern-
ments are able to issue longevity bonds on behalf of younger and future generations
only if they reduce their exposure to longevity risk by linking the age at which these
generations ﬁrst receive their public pension to life expectancy.
Also tax beneﬁts for pension saving can be linked to life expectancy.19 The rule
of automatically linking public pensions and tax privileges to life expectancy avoids
the political costs of discretionary decisions to limit eligibility to public pensions and
tax beneﬁts if longevity increases further. Agreeing on a risk-sharing rule ex ante also
reduces the political risks associated with collective discretionary decision-making.
Moreover, it allows individuals and ﬁrms to gradually adapt to a longer working
life by better maintaining human capital and adjusting the organization of work. An
increase in spending on disability pensions and unemployment beneﬁts is thereby
avoided.
Increase ﬂexibility labour market One of the challenges for the Dutch pension sys-
tem is create a more ﬂexible labour market for elderly workers. Together with better-
maintained human capital, a more ﬂexible labour market for older workers allows
the speed and extent of phased retirement to act as a buffer for absorbing aggregate
ﬁnancial-market and longevity risks. In an actuarially neutral pension system, work-
ing one year longer (and thus receiving annuities one year later) tends to raise the
annual pension by about 7%. The speed and timing of retirement is thus a powerful
instrument for absorbing risks. Allowing the speed and timing of retirement to act as
an instrument to buffer risk requires adjusting the implicit labour contract according
to which workers are underpaid when young and overpaid later on. Indeed, increasing
the retirement age at which the employer lays off the employee must not put undue
strain on the employer. Employees should thus accept more wage ﬂexibility over the
life course (payment according to labour productivity; i.e., mark to market reward
for labour) and internal ﬂexibility in working practices (so as to protect their labour
productivity at higher ages).
With a more ﬂexible labour market for elderly workers, older workers bear less
risk because they are less dependent on their ﬁrm surviving. The differences narrow
19In fact, one can argue that all ages that are used to measure old age should be linked to longevity. In
other words, one should measure old age from the end rather than the beginning of life (see also Shoven
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between the insiders who are lucky enough to work for a surviving ﬁrm and the out-
siders whose ﬁrms have not survived. Moreover, golden chains no longer tie older
workers to their employer. This facilitates entrepreneurship and a more efﬁcient al-
location of labour. More generally, more ﬂexible labour markets with new, ﬂexible
career patterns should allow young households to bear more risks by allowing these
households to vary their labour effort depending on the shocks they have experienced
throughout their lifetime. This requires European labour markets to become more in-
clusive so that workers do not have to be continuously employed full-time in order to
enjoy a successful career. In such a transitional labour market, the role of employers
thus shifts from a risk-bearing sponsor to, ﬁrst, a facilitator of investments in human
capital; second, an insurer of that human capital by protecting it; third, the creator of
ﬂexible work arrangements that allow elderly workers to adjust the speed and time of
retirement to the pension rights; and fourth, the creator of ﬂexible career paths and
workplaces that allow young parents to invest in the human capital of their children
without having to depreciate their own human capital. Employers should attune work
to the needs of employees who want to remain employable in the face of substantial
family obligations and rapid innovation (and thus creative destruction).
Employers may also assist in creating collective pools for old-age and other hu-
man capital insurances (such as disability and unemployment insurances) for their
workers. By thus keeping the costs of these kinds of insurance under control, they
improve their position on the labour market and reduce their wage costs. An impor-
tant factor in determining the types of insurance and the optimal investments of the
pension scheme is the type of human capital of the workers and the associated risks
and possibilities to absorb risks by adjusting labour supply. This suggests that the
pools should be homogeneous in terms of human capital. Moreover, the retirement
plans should be closely integrated with human-resource management (HRM) of the
employers.
Develop tailor-made policies We already argued that default contribution and in-
vestment strategies should be age dependent. Moreover, in setting the default port-
folio, one can take into account other characteristics of members besides age—such
as the nature of human capital, the income level, the ﬂexibility of retirement choices
implied by the ﬂexibility of the labour market for elderly and owner-occupied hous-
ing and its ﬁnancing. To illustrate, agents with particularly risky human capital that is
strongly correlated with ﬁnancial-market risks should invest less in risk-bearing as-
sets(seeViceira2001).Thesameholdstrueforworkersthatareliquidityconstrained,
face substantial idiosyncratic human-capital risk, exhibit habit formation, and do not
exhibit much ﬂexibility in their retirement choices and thus cannot use the speed and
timing of retirement to absorb risks (see Bodie et al. 1992; and Gollier 2005). These
individual ﬁnancial planning solutions tend to become more important now that indi-
vidual life cycles have become more heterogeneous and information technology al-
lows for more tailor-made products. At the same time, the costs of more tailor-made
features in collective schemes should be traded off against the associated additional
transaction costs and the potential for adverse selection. Another reason for paying
more attention to individual solutions is the increasing number of self-employed indi-
viduals who are not served by sectoral and company pension funds and have to make
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Extend life-cycle ﬁnancial planning Pension funds can become ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries that help individuals with their ﬁnancial planning over the life cycle. In particu-
lar, they can advise workers in accumulating and insuring human and ﬁnancial capital
over the life cycle. During the active phase of the life cycle they may help workers in
insuring their human capital through disability and unemployment insurances. These
risks typically rise as people become older. Indeed, the optimal retirement age de-
pends on idiosyncratic health and labour-market risks. In contrast to pension insur-
ance, however, disability and unemployment insurances involve moral hazard; better
insurance reduces the incentives to maintain human capital. Accordingly, these in-
surances inevitably include substantial own-risks. Deductibles help to internalize the
costs of insurance payments, thereby discouraging individuals from making exces-
sive claims. Precautionary saving can improve the trade-off between insurance and
incentives by facilitating self-insurance. Pension funds may help to ﬁnd the optimal
mix of saving and insurance. Moreover, integration of part of pension saving with
precautionary saving may be optimal (see Stiglitz and Yun 2002).
During the retirement phase, the elderly need integrated advice on their housing,
health care, the type of annuity (possibly of the escalating type) and, possibly, part-
time labour income. Linking reverse life insurance through annuities to health-care
insurance can combat selection. Bad risks for an annuity company tend to be good
risks for health insurers, and the other way around. Moreover, by providing health
insurance, an insurance company reduces the need for liquidity, thereby making an-
nuitization more attractive. Also in health insurance, moral hazard may be important,
especially for relatively small risks such as required personal services around the
home. For these risks, precautionary saving may thus be appropriate. This implies
that annuities should be complemented with liquid private saving.
Improve pension governance Another challenge is to adjust the governance struc-
ture to the newly emerging risk-sharing contracts in which members bear risks in
stand-alone pension funds mainly in terms of their pension rights rather than in terms
of recovery premia. Rather than those who pay the premium (i.e. employers and/or
employees as participants), the members of a pension fund (i.e. those who have pen-
sion rights) should have their interests represented in the governing board.20 If mem-
bers are residual risk bearers but social partners have a large say in the governing
board, then social partners may be tempted to put pressure on the fund to set the
price for new pension rights (i.e. the pension contributions) below the market value
for these additional rights. The current members in fact pay the associated implicit
subsidy on the additional pension rights for participants.
Also the management of the funds should be conducted in a professional man-
ner. Pension fund trustees and supervisory bodies are not always well equipped to
understand complex investment principles and regulations, and to monitor their fund
managers adequately. Outside professionals can help in this respect. This calls for
a two-tier governance structure for pension funds with, ﬁrst, a supervisory board or
20Employers, however, are still stakeholders in the pension fund to which their workers belong. In par-
ticular, a well-functioning pension fund implies low insurance costs for the workers. This enhances the
position of the employer on the labour market, thereby reducing wage costs.466 L. Bovenberg, T. Nijman
board of trustees representing the interests of members and, second, a professional
executive board to deal with the funds’ daily operations. The board of trustees should
be appointed by a meeting of members.
6 Conclusions
Old institutions for retirement provision, such as extensive PAYG schemes and cor-
porate DB schemes, are crumbling rapidly because governments and companies are
withdrawing from their roles as risk sponsors. In the absence of new pension insti-
tutions that are better adapted to the modern knowledge economy in which we live,
individual DC schemes are likely to become the dominant pension contract for sup-
plementing the remaining public pension beneﬁts. In most of these schemes, individ-
uals have a tough time planning for their retirement. Indeed, more and more evidence
emerges around the world suggesting that households by themselves cannot imple-
ment complex ﬁnancial planning and must delegate these decisions to institutions.
Dutch pension funds have been evolving in the direction of stand-alone coopera-
tive pension funds as an attractive third way between the corporate DB schemes and
the individual pension plans.
In the years to come, further gradual reforms will be required to modify Dutch
collective pension schemes in view of aging, a more transitional labour market, and
more heterogeneous tastes and needs. Responding sooner rather than later will allow
pension reforms to be implemented gradually rather than suddenly. Conﬁdence in
stable, credible long-term commitments will thus be maintained, thereby allowing
the Dutch pension sector to keep its leading position in the world of pensions.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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